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Abstract
Despite the significance of the German invasion of Greece in 1941 
within the international history of the Second World War, relatively little 
research has yet been conducted into many of its operational aspects. As 
a consequence, over the last 70 years a number of serious misconceptions 
have developed and been used to explain (or explain-away) British defeat 
within this campaign. Foremost is the notion of a huge disparity in num­
bers -  against which Commonwealth troops, despite their courage and stoic 
resolve, could never stand. This key explanation is mistaken. By no means 
and by no measure did overwhelming German numbers push Imperial 
troops unwillingly out of Greece.
The German invasion of Greece, launched on 6 April 1941, was precipi­
tated by the Italo-Greek war which began on 28 October the previous year. 
Mussolini’s legions marched south from Albania, but after a period of initial 
success against the Greeks, Italian troops found themselves driven steadily 
back across the frontier. Greek military success in the closing months of 
1940 meant that an earlier British pledge of military aid, should the nation 
be invaded by a foreign power, largely unnecessary. The pace of unfolding 
events in the Balkans during the early months of 1941, however, soon ne­
cessitated a strategic re-think in Athens and in London. Signs of a pending 
German intervention grew steadily more obvious and the Greeks at last,
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but not without reservations, reversed their previous position and invited 
the British to send ground forces into Greece.
The corps-sized force despatched from Middle East Command to re­
inforce the Greeks against a looming German invasion was built around an 
Australian and a New Zealand infantry division. These two formations were 
supplemented by a British armoured brigade. There was little time, how­
ever, for this small corps to familiarise itself with Greece or the enormity 
of its task. In fact, when German troops thrust into Greece and Yugoslavia 
on 6 April the British and Dominion expeditionary force was still in the 
process of arriving from Egypt. The defences of southern Yugoslavia were 
crushed by the German advance within a few days and the ensuing invasion 
of Greece (Operation M arita) lasted just over three weeks. It was a rapid and 
decisive German victory. During the course of the campaign in mainland 
Greece British and Commonwealth troops (collectively known as W Force) 
retreated more than 400 kilometres in less than two weeks before ignomini- 
ously evacuating the country. This final withdrawal from Greece was carried 
out from the beaches near Athens and in the Peloponnese from 23-28 April. 
Around 50 000 Allied troops in total managed to escape the Greek main­
land -  many more than senior British officers originally thought might get 
away. A large proportion of these evacuees were shipped to Crete, which was 
subsequently attacked by German forces on 20 May.
There is no question that the Greek campaign was central to the 
strategic developments in Europe in early 1941 for both the Axis and the 
Allies. Despite its significance, however, very little academic attention has 
been focused onto Greece; and especially the operational aspects of this 
campaign. Certainly mention of the mainland Greek campaign is made in 
larger works on modern Greek military, and diplomatic history. So too, it 
appears as an episode in the official histories of the belligerents, personal 
memoirs, and biographies. Very few books, or even scholarly articles, how­
ever, have been published specifically on the period of the German inva­
sion. Fewer still deal in any meaningful or detailed way with operational 
events.1 Many of those that have focused on tactical and operational events 
are often uncritical narratives of event or colourful anecdotes.2 Even if 
such works are included in the tally of works published on the Greek cam­
paign, the sum total is still very small. It represents but a fraction of the re­
search done in recent years, for example, into the operational aspects of the
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invasions of Crete or France. The battle for mainland Greece in April 1941 
thus remains somewhat of a historiographical ‘gap’.
In place or serious and comprehensive study, a powerful set of 
myths and misconceptions have grown to dominate the English-language 
narrative of the Greek campaign. Initially, and understandably, many were 
derived from Allied wartime propaganda - 1941 was a period of extreme 
anxiety and desperation for Britain and the Dominions. It was not a time 
for cold and dispassionate analysis. An immediate interpretation of events 
in Greece was required that softened the blow, and helped explain away 
what was clearly a disaster. Significant mistruths also grew from self-serv­
ing post-campaign reports and immediate post-war memoirs from senior 
Allied officers present in Greece and conscious of the need to protect their 
professional reputations. After the war and for the next 70 years these types 
of distorted accounts -  often accepted without question or critique - have 
informed the dominant English-language narrative. One of the most potent 
of the misconceptions about the Greek campaign still used to ‘explain’ the 
W Force defeat is the notion of a huge disparity in numbers against which 
gallant Allied troops could not compete. As the newspapers of the day re­
corded, ‘In every battle in the 300 mile retreat our men fought against odds 
of three, four or five to one.’3 The general interpretation is that vastly out­
numbered and largely isolated W Force detachments were only pushed from 
their defensive positions numerically superior Nazi hordes. If the defenders 
had only been able to fight on equal terms then the debacle in Greece out­
come may well have been reversed. This key explanation of W Force’s defeat, 
however, is wrong.
It is appropriate at this stage to provide samples of the establishment 
and evolution of this myth. Soon after the war the British government it­
self sponsored and published monographs concerning events in Greece. 
One of the more prominent lamented how W Force was ‘too thin on the 
ground’ and how much it was ‘overmatched’ by ‘... far more numerous Ger­
man adversaries.’4 This type of pseudo-propaganda was soon built upon by a 
number of influential post-war memoirs and biographies. Lieutenant Gen­
eral H.M. Wilson, the officer in command of W Force, himself published an 
account of Greece which, unsurprisingly, reinforced the idea of a decisive 
German numerical advantage.5 The memoirs of Vice-Admiral H.T Baillie- 
Grohman, who was intimately involved with the final British evacuation
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from Greece, lamented how the defenders were ‘beaten, not through lack of 
courage or skill’, but because they ‘did not possess the quality and quantity 
of arms with which to win.’6 Even John Connell’s well-constructed 1964 bi­
ography of Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, British Commander-in-chief in 
the Middle East in 1941, reinforced the by now well-established orthodoxy 
that W Force reversals were a consequence of an ‘... immense numerical su­
periority’ held by the Germans.7
The early orthodoxy of the idea of the decisiveness of superior Ger­
man numbers was further established and reinforced by the British, New 
Zealand and Australian official histories of the campaign. The first of these 
to be published, I.S.O. Playfair’s 1956 account of Britain’s war in the Middle 
East, described the ‘SS Adolf Hitler Division and the 9th Panzer Division’ 
doing battle with an Australian brigade near Vevi in northern Greece, the 
6th Mountain and 2nd Panzer Divisions overwhelming another W Force bri­
gade at the Pinios Gorge; and the ‘German 72nd Division’ making a ‘night 
attack at Molos’.8 Here Playfair is misleading. At no time throughout the 
campaign in Greece did these German divisions ever fight as formations. He 
might have qualified such inferences by adding phrases such as ‘reconnais­
sance elements from ...’ or ‘the leading elements o f ...’ Three years after Play­
fair’s account of Greece was published, W.G. McClymont’s official history of 
New Zealand’s involvement was released. It too stressed ‘the small Imperial 
force available’ and contrasted it to ‘the strength of the German army’.9 The 
Australian official history of the campaign, written by Gavin Long and pub­
lished in 1962, did nothing to challenge this prevailing interpretation. For 
Long, W Force’s defeat was a consequence of ‘an enemy force stronger in 
both armour and infantry.’10 ‘ [T]he most vital factor in their defeat of our 
troops in Greece’ he noted ‘was Germany’s overwhelming superiority on the 
ground... In the words of one senior officer, it was a case of one unarmoured 
man against six armoured men’.11
Thirty years of consistent and unchallenged English-language tradition 
of framing W Force’s defeat in Greece through the filter of numerical mis­
match continued to shape the few books published in the 1970s that related 
to the campaign. A biography of Major General Iven Mackay, in command 
of the 6th Australian Division in Greece in 1975, for example, described in 
detail how 22 German divisions in the Balkans fought against ‘a handful of 
ill-equipped Greek divisions, a New Zealand and an Australian division, and
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a British brigade armoured group.’12 Mackay himself is quoted as claiming 
that ‘no general in his right mind would tackle them [the Germans] in open 
battle without guaranteed superiority -  in the number of division but espe­
cially tanks’; yet numerical superiority, as will be demonstrated, was often 
on the Allied side in Greece.13
To take a wider perspective, more general studies of the Second World 
War from the 1970 onwards have continued to be influenced by the mis­
taken idea of W Force numerical disadvantage in Greece. A.J.P. Taylor de­
scribed the campaign as pursued with inadequate means’.14 John Keegan 
wrote that the defenders, ‘lacked the numbers and equipment to resist the 
Germans’ as ‘three British divisions and six Greek divisions spared from the 
Albanian front had battled against eighteen of the enemy...’15 This never 
happened. Other more recent and specialised work has tended to continue 
the tradition. Douglas Porch’s comprehensive volume on the Mediterrane­
an theatre in the Second World War published in 2005, for example, refers 
to a ‘looming [but not actual] German avalanche’ in Greece, and how W 
Force ‘faced 13 divisions bearing down on the Aliakmon line’ -  an enormous 
number of troops which, of course, never came close to reaching this Allied 
position before it was abandoned.16
Some of the most conspicuous contemporary champions of the myth 
that W Force was pushed out of Greece by superior German numbers are 
more ‘populist’ accounts of the campaign, particularly those published in 
Australia. In 2008 Forgotten Anzacs, for example, was released describing 
how W Force had ‘attempted to hold the mightiest military force the world 
had ever seen’.17 Nowhere, apparently, had British and Dominion troops 
‘faced longer odds’ than in Greece.18 In another account, published only last 
year, in one particular action a W Force brigade was described as doing bat­
tle with ‘four German divisions on their own’ -  a gross overestimation of the 
number or German troops present at the engagement in question.19 A sub­
sequent description of an action fought at Brallos Pass similarly describes 
a defending W Force brigade as ‘holding off the German 6th Mountain Divi­
sion’.20 It most certainly did not. Small leading elements of this German 
division were present, but this is entirely different from the inference that 
the whole formation fought at Brallos.
Certainly, for those who were present in Greece in 1941 and for writ­
ers interested in celebrating or commemorating their efforts, there is much
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to recommend the notion of enormous German numerical superiority in 
this campaign. Under this blanket explanation little blame can be attached 
to the defeated British and Dominion force. The force faced grossly mis­
matched numerical odds and had no choice but to retire down the Greek 
peninsula, then evacuate, due to sheer weight of German numbers. But it 
is not true. This idea, as convenient as it might have been at the time and 
as comfortable as it has no doubt been for many authors since, informs a 
mistaken historical interpretation of the campaign. The overall ‘truth’ in 
Greece, and the central argument of this article, is that at the point o f  contact 
between defending W Force troops and the attackers most often it was the 
Germans that were outnumbered.
The first phase of the German invasion of Greece as it unfolded did 
not actually involve W Force. Rather, the initial German attacks launched 
from across the Bulgarian frontier, mounted in conjunction with simulta­
neous thrusts into southern Yugoslavia, were aimed at breaking the un­
dermanned Greek defences of the Metaxas Line -  a 155 kilometre long 
chain of fortifications constructed along the line of the Greco-Bulgarian 
border and named after the former Greek dictator. The first time Imperial 
troops faced the Germans in battle was in a short and intense engage­
ment fought at Kleidi Pass, near the village of Vevi, between 12-13 April. 
This action resulted from an early and serious Yugoslav collapse in south­
ern Serbia which exposed northern Greece to invasion along the axis of 
the ‘Monastir Gap’ -  a valley running from Monastir in the north to the 
Greek city of Fiorina, 13 kilometres south of the Yugoslavian border. As a 
consequence of events in southern Yugoslavia, German troops were soon 
streaming down this passage, threatening to flank the W Force line to the 
east. In response the 19th Australian Brigade, along with flanking Greek 
formations, was rushed northwards to plug the gap at Kleidi. The ensuing 
battle was a clear German victory. By the evening of 13 April the forward 
elements of Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Regiment, followed by vanguard 
elements of the 9th Panzer Division, were through the Kleidi Pass and were 
headed south. The defenders were mauled but nonetheless managed to 
escape in what was best described as a less than an orderly withdrawal 
south. German numbers, however, (much like German armour which was 
not actually present at the battle until the rout had begun) cannot be said 
to have been decisive.21
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Put plainly, the traditional idea that ‘the defending force available 
[at Kleidi Pass] was not adequate by the time the German push came’ and 
that ‘the enemy was far too strong to be held for any length of time by the 
troops available to us’ -  that the defenders could do nothing in the face of 
overwhelming German numbers -  is untrue.22 The German force which was 
actually in combat with the defenders on 12 April was numerically inferior. 
The Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Regiment attacked with two reinforced 
battalion groups. Only one of these (the Witt Group of six infantry com­
panies) was directed at the Kleidi Pass itself. The other (the Weidenhaupt 
Group also of six infantry companies) was directed to the east against the 
villages of Kelli and Petres, and through remnants of the withdrawing Greek 
Dodecanese Regiment’s position. The third German battle group, the Appel 
Group from the 9th Panzer Division, operated to the left of Kleidi Pass and 
had a negligible bearing on the outcome of the battle. The 19th Australian 
Brigade defended Kleidi Pass and either side of it with a brigade group of 
three battalions, an anti-tank battalion, half of a machine gun battalion, 
two field artillery regiments and a medium artillery regiment. Thus the Witt 
Group’s one and a half battalions attacked three defending battalions at this 
key point. It is likely that during their advance the right hand elements of 
Weidenhaupt Group made contact with the right flank of the 2/8th Austral­
ian Battalion. Even so, however, this only raised the ratio to perhaps two 
attacking battalions against three defending battalions. The key Kleidi Pass 
road position was penetrated by the equivalent of three companies from 
Witt Group at a maximum. The uncomfortable truth is that the Allies were 
shifted from their line at Kleidi by a considerably numerically inferior force.23
Following the action at Kleidi Pass, W Force waited anxiously as the 
leading German troops closed up to and began to probe a series of defended 
passes along the Aliakmon Line, while plans were hurriedly developed to 
withdraw much further south to a new line at Thermopylae. Importantly, 
skirmishes across the W Force line during this period represented rearguard 
efforts to slow, not to stop the German advance. Sharp engagements like 
that in the vicinity of Katerini, for example, by the New Zealand Cavalry 
Regiment, were designed to delay, not to prevent, the German advance 
over the Aliakmon River in that sector. So too, actions at the Servia and 
the Olympus Passes (and at Plantamon) were all undertaken within the 
context of a looming withdrawal to the Thermopylae Line. Invariably, the
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defenders in these localities were instructed to hold only for so long as a 
withdrawal could be arranged. Further west, as the British armoured brigade 
was moving progressively south, one troop commander noted: ‘I’ve been a 
rearguard or a road block for two days and two nights, and I haven’t seen 
or heard a German...’.24 He went on to ask, ‘what the devil are we running 
away from?’25 Across the W Force front, according to the German 2nd Panzer 
Division, the enemy ‘has not yet ventured to fight.’26 Within the framework 
of an overall effort by W Force to delay the German advance rather than to 
halt it, it is possible to continue to track the theme of decisively superior 
numbers at the point of battle.
On 16 April the Germans put in a number of attacks put in against 
the 5th New Zealand Brigade at the Olympus Pass. These were, however, 
primarily conducted by two infantry companies (against the 28th (Maori) 
Battalion) and two companies of cyclists (against the 22nd New Zealand Bat­
talion). There was no numerical advantage to the attackers here. In fact, 
the only sector in which the Germans were able to bring superior weight 
of numbers and firepower against the W Force line during this phase was 
on the eastern flank at Plantamon. Here, the 21st New Zealand Battalion 
was progressively forced from its position by the equivalent of two German 
battalions supported by armour. To return to context, however, in this sec­
tor the defenders did not choose to stay and fight. Rather, after sustaining 
a meagre 35 casualties, and against the instructions and the clear intent 
passed earlier to him by Freyberg, the New Zealand battalion commander 
withdrew before his unit was decisively committed. It is this choice, and 
subsequent events on this crucial right hand flank of the W Force Line in 
the vicinity of Pinios Gorge, which would decide much of how the remain­
der of the campaign unfolded.27
There is no question that taken in overall terms events in the vicinity 
of Pinios Gorge between 17-18 April were critical. The chances of W Force 
successfully withdrawing to the Thermopylae Line were in many ways reli­
ant on the staying power of the hastily deployed brigade sent to the area 
with orders to hold out until the morning of 19 April, after which time 
threat to the bottle-neck at Larissa would have passed and a potentially dis­
astrous situation would have been saved. At the same time, the opportunity 
to crack the defenders in this location, and thus cut-off a large proportion 
of W Force while it was moving south through Larissa represented a signifi-
1 5 4
H is t o r y
cant opportunity for the Germans. A German attack was mounted in this 
sector over the period 17-18 April and, although successful in routing the 
defenders, the composite Australian and New Zealand brigade in this area 
nonetheless managed to hold on for sufficient time to protect Larissa -  if 
only by the skin of its teeth.
Again, the idea that W Force troops at Pinios Gorge were pushed from 
their positions by vastly superior German numbers is a premise that under­
pins many English-language accounts of the engagement, especially those 
written in Australia. In this regard they echo the press reports of the time 
which claimed the Australians and New Zealanders in this battle participat­
ed in distinctly ‘unequal combat’, in that they ‘held up two divisions, which 
outnumbered them by a least ten to one.’28 This perception was also present 
in the minds of W Force soldiers stationed elsewhere and still yet to meet a 
German attack. A soldier from the 2/6th Australian Battalion, for example, 
noted with bitterness in his diary after the battle at Pinios that ‘no doubt 
the Hun is well-equipped in everything as well as numbers.’29 Such conten­
tions are, of course, nonsense. The defending brigade group at the Pinios 
Gorge faced attack by elements of two German divisions, but it certainly 
did not fight them as divisions. In fact, the 21st New Zealand Battalion was 
assaulted, in the morning of 18 April, by 6-9 German tanks, around two 
companies of troops from 112th Reconnaissance Unit firing from across the 
gorge, a small detachment of infantrymen from 8/800th Special Unit, and 
small patrols from the 7th Battalion, 304th Regiment which had managed 
to cross to the south bank of the Pinios River. This force increased as the 
afternoon approached, but by this stage the 21st New Zealand Battalion was 
in the process of withdrawing from the field. When account is taken of the 
anti-tank support available to this battalion, the force that routed the New 
Zealanders was roughly equivalent to their own.30
Similarly, on the western flank of the defenders’ position, the 2/2nd 
Australian Battalion was attacked from the west during the morning of 18 
April by a single German battalion (the 3rd Battalion, 143rd Regiment), less 
a company despatched to perform an ambushing task in depth. This attack 
was covered by a feint by the 1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment. Even conceding 
that in the afternoon the Australians were under fire from some elements 
of a German infantry/armoured emerging from the gorge, and faced an at­
tack by the 1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment when it eventually moved against
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the village of Evangelismos, the actual numbers of troops engaging each 
other on the ground on this flank does not give much of a numerical ad­
vantage to the Germans. Certainly, in both instances, had the defenders 
held for longer, then the Germans would have been free to concentrate an 
ever increasing force against them -  but such a concentration proved to be 
unnecessary. The engagement at Pinios Gorge, as it eventuated as opposed 
to how it might have developed, was fought between roughly equivalent 
ground forces. The story was the same in terms of artillery. The German at­
tack was only effectively supported by the 1st Battalion, 118th Mountain Ar­
tillery Regiment, which was low on ammunition and could deliver only 400 
rounds all day on 18 April. The 1st Battalion, 95th Mountain Artillery Regi­
ment only arrived on the scene at 3.00pm, too late to be effective as German 
forces were already advancing on the south side of the Pinios. Against this 
the 4th (NZ) Field Regiment supported the defenders throughout.31
Following its narrow escape through Larissa, the period 19-24 April 
was marked by three key developments for W Force -  the ongoing with­
drawal and occupation of the Thermopylae Line, the capitulation of the 
Greek Albanian armies, and a continuing planning for the evacuation of W 
force from Greece. In a very important way the period represented a period 
of ‘success’ for W Force in that it manned, consolidated and held the Ther­
mopylae Line long enough to facilitate the beginning of the evacuation. In 
the process the 19th Australian and 6th NZ Brigades, in particular, managed 
to delay the German advance sufficiently, and at the same withdraw skilfully 
enough to escape German clutches and slip away without significant casual­
ties. The W Force line at Thermopylae was thus unbroken, proclaimed the 
press in Britain and the Dominions, thanks to the ‘earnest resolution and 
the Anzac spirit’.32 But in these types of quotes lies the essence of the prob­
lem of historical misinterpretation of Greece. W Force delaying operations 
at Thermopylae were a success -  but as was the case throughout the cam­
paign in no way was this a case of stout-hearted defence against overwhelm­
ing waves of Germans held together by the ‘mateship’ of trans-Tasman al­
lies. The real explanation was much more prosaic.
The first reason why the Thermopylae Line stood long enough to begin 
effecting the W Force evacuation from Greece was the difficult and sluggish 
German concentration of force in the vicinity of Lamia to the immediate 
north. A single axis of advance for two armoured divisions and a moun-
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tain division caused monumental traffic control problems that were never 
rectified. Congested roads and Allied demolitions combined to ensure that 
a grand total of only one company of German tanks were available to pres­
sure the W Force line at Thermopylae before its scheduled withdrawal. Ma­
jor General H. von Greiffenberg, Chief of Staff of the 12th Army, considered 
that the destruction of road bottle-necks and bridges north of Thermopy­
lae was ‘most effective’ in delaying a pursuit.33 Major L. Glonbik, an intelli­
gence officer on the 12th Army’s headquarters, agreed that such demolitions 
caused a lamentable ‘delay in operations.’34 Had it not been for such demo­
litions, topography, or the underdeveloped state of Greek roads north of 
Thermopylae, then the W Force line would have been smashed by superior 
numbers with little concern over the defensive power of the Anzac spirit. 
Such numbers, however, never arrived. Moreover, if any branch of W Force 
contributed to this delay it was not the infantrymen of the two forward 
brigades, but the accurate and intensive Allied artillery fire applied to the 
vicinity of Lamia throughout this period. The fact that W Force was evacu­
ating and that such guns were therefore to be destroyed in place helped in 
this regard as all could be manned until the last moment by skeleton crews. 
Had the corps been withdrawing to another defensive line then the artillery 
would have been required to depart much earlier than it did, and again the 
result would likely have been different.35
The reality was that as had been the case at Pinios Gorge, most of the 
pressure applied against Brallos and the Thermopylae Passes of the Ther­
mopylae Line was from a small number of dismounted German infantry­
men, most of whom had already undertaken exhausting marches with re­
stricted supplies even to get to the Thermopylae Line. The fact that such 
light forces were used against the Allied line was a consequence of the de­
lay in getting heavy forces forward already noted, and of German doctrine 
which encouraged quick attacks of the line of march by light screening 
forces. What this meant, in effect, was once again the Germans mounted 
a series of attacks in an ad hoc and impromptu fashion that put them at a 
numerical disadvantage. At Brallos the four battalions of the 19th Australian 
Brigade were attacked by small detachments from three German infantry 
battalions within the Jais Group (55th Motorcycle Battalion, and the 1st and 
2nd Battalions, 141st Mountain Regiment). At Molos the 24 companies of 
the 6th New Zealand Brigade were assaulted initially only by two companies
157
H is t o r y
of infantrymen (9th and 11th Companies, 3rd Battalion, 124th Regiment) and 
a troop of tanks. This was followed a little later by a second unsuccessful 
German attack using the same two companies and a company of tanks. In 
the final attack against the NZ position at 6.00pm the Germans threw four 
infantry companies (with the addition of two from the 112th Reconnais­
sance Unit) against the defenders.36 The balance of forces equation was still 
clearly against the attackers here. Furthermore, the medium regiment (less 
one troop), four field regiments, two anti-tank regiments and a light anti­
aircraft battery available to the New Zealanders dwarfed the limited amount 
of artillery the Germans could press forward in this sector throughout the 
day. Had German artillery been massed in the Stylis area, 12km from Molos 
and taken on 21 April, then this imbalance would not have existed. The op­
portunity, however, was missed. The balance of force equation alone might 
have predicted the outcome -  and it was a balance firmly in favour of the 
defenders.37
The only significant engagement between W Force and German troops 
in which the latter had any real numerical advantage occurred on 26 April 
when an airborne attack was launched to capture the bridge over the Cor­
inth Canal in order to cut off the continuing W Force withdrawal into the 
Peloponnese. The attack, despite the loss of the bridge which was destroyed 
in the skirmishing that followed the German descent, was a success. The W 
Force effort to defend the Corinth sector was uncoordinated and ineffective. 
In truth, had the Germans launched this airborne assault even 48 hours 
earlier then the consequences for W Force would have been catastrophic. 
Trapped in the vicinity of Athens and blocked from using the southern Pelo­
ponnese beaches British evacuation plans would have been destroyed. By 26 
April, however, the operation was mounted too late to seriously interrupt 
the ongoing British and Dominion evacuations -  although it did lead to a 
few moments of serious concern for the 4th New Zealand Brigade before it 
was withdrawn from the Athens beaches. The German attack on Corinth 
was mounted by two battalions of 2nd Parachute Regiment, 1st Parachute 
Division, reinforced by a parachute medical company and engineer troop. 
Opposing this force was a thin line of defenders in the area which included 
a detachment from the 4 th Hussars and the three rifle companies from the 
19th NZ and the 2/6th Australian Battalions already dug in. These troops 
were supported by a squadron of the NZ cavalry regiment and two carrier
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platoons from the 22nd New Zealand and 28th (Maori) Battalions.38 Impor­
tantly, the numerical mismatch at Corinth, although coming down in favour 
of the attackers, was not very large, and it by no means accounted for the 
ease of German success in this operation or the frail inadequacy of the W 
Force defensive effort at Corinth which was immediately and completely 
overwhelmed.39
In overall terms the ensuing W Force evacuation from Greece was un­
questionably a success. Around 50 000 men were taken from Greece with 
12 000 more lost -  mostly as prisoners -  two thirds of which were taken at 
Kalamata before they could be shipped to Alexandria or the relative safety 
of Crete. This was a significant achievement for increasingly desperate W 
Force planners and the Royal Navy. The final numbers salvaged from Greece 
were far in excess of initial predictions by senior British officers that a third 
of the force deployed would be lucky to escape. In regards to the question of 
numerical mismatches the W Force disaster at Kalamata warrants particu­
lar attention. Here, during 28 April around 8000 troops were still stranded 
and it was towards this mass that the continuing German thrust into the 
Peloponnese was aimed. During the morning W Force troops were arranged 
in groups for embarkation that night. Meanwhile, continuing Luftwaffe air 
raids, mostly strafing runs by Me. 109s, saw casualties mounting. Orders for 
the evacuation tasked the New Zealand ‘Reinforcement Battalion’ troops 
with defending the northern approach to town while the armed Australian 
sub-units were to be held as a reserve. From 6.00pm the waiting columns 
were to assemble and begin move to quay, which was to be guarded by an 
armed 50 man detachment posted to prevent embarkations out of order. 
A small two-squadron screen further to the north of the town from the 4th 
Hussars, the last elements scheduled to depart, was to withdraw at 12.30am 
towards the quay. Armed fighting troops were to be evacuated first, with 
labourers and Yugoslavian military refugees the last to leave.40
At 4.00pm, 28 April, the Hussars screen reported no Germans within 
40km of the beach. Shortly thereafter, however, a German column appeared 
and engaged the Hussars astride the road to Kalamata. A short action broke 
out, the Hussars disintegrated and the Germans pressed on. Two hours lat­
er, at 6.00pm, as W Force troops at Kalamata began organising themselves 
in preparation before moving down the beach, a reinforced German com-
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pany, having earlier burst through the Hussar screen, drove into Kalamata. 
Meeting no opposition, as most W Force troops were gathered east of town, 
the German company took scattered prisoners and pressed on to the har­
bour where it drew up near a customs house. There the Germans guarded 
their prisoners and began to probe eastwards along the waterfront. As no 
serious fighting had yet developed more Allied soldiers were surprised and 
captured, including a Royal Navy beach-master with his signaller, whose 
task was to have been to coordinate the planned embarkation. Two German 
field guns were set up on the wharf and began to shell the W Force dispersal 
areas. German machine guns and mortars soon added their weight of fire.41 
The Germans were, from this point, progressively attacked by bands of 
semi-organised British, Australian and New Zealand troops in the Kalamata 
area. Finally, surrounded, hard pressed, with severe casualties, and out of 
ammunition, the remaining Germans surrendered at around 9.30pm. They 
were disarmed and their weapons thrown into the sea. The German compa­
ny group had taken 101 casualties, including 41 killed.42 Crucially, the proc­
ess of fighting on the Kalamata waterfront had encouraged the naval task 
force scheduled to conduct the evacuation from Kalamata, to abandon the 
operation. Close to 8000 W Force troops were subsequently surrendered by 
their commander, although a small proportion chose to flee into the coun­
tryside rather than to walk quietly into captivity. There is no question that a 
range of factors and circumstances contributed to this disaster for W Force 
at Kalamata -  and it is beyond this investigation to explore them. The note­
worthy point here, however, in regards to numerical mismatches, was the 
impact at Kalamata of around 150 German infantrymen -  outnumbered by 
more than fifty to one.
In conclusion, the idea of W Force facing insurmountable numeri­
cal odds in Greece in 1941 remains an enduring and powerful theme. This 
mistaken mantra began early as a way to help conveniently explain away 
the speed and scale of Allied defeat. Throughout May 1941, as the Domin­
ion press in particular began dissecting the failure of W Force, this ‘accept­
able’ explanation found traction. In Australia the Sydney Morning Herald de­
scribed the Anzac Corps as ‘[t]he Davids of the Southern Cross’, who ‘fought 
in Greece against the German Goliath.’43 W Force was just ‘too small to 
hold the weight of military power that Germany had been able to assem­
ble.’44 Such sentiments were echoed by high profile politicians such as An-
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thony Eden who told the Greeks by radio in early May that: ‘You have been 
overcome by overwhelming superiority of numbers...you have not been 
defeated.’45 He was, of course, wildly mistaken on both counts. Churchill 
himself erroneously noted that ‘on several occasions, sometimes for two 
days at a time’, the Germans ‘were brought to a standstill by forces one fifth 
of their number...’.46 The myth also suited Allied generals looking to deflect 
awkward questions and inferences about the campaign. ‘The truth is’, wrote 
Mackay in June 1941, ‘that the force of two divisions for which for various 
reasons the Anzac Corps was limited was never sufficiently numerous.’47 
Certainly this idea permeated throughout all ranks of W Force, especially 
once the campaign was over. ‘We were at all times hopelessly outnumbered’, 
lamented an officer of the 2 / l st Australian Battalion.48
On the surface, a simple contrast between the 12th Army and W 
Force orders of battle seems to bear out the idea of German decisive numer­
ical superiority. After all, on 28 April, the last night of organised W Force 
evacuation, five of the 12th Army’s 14 divisions were south of the plain of 
Thessaly and 10 were in Greece -  not to mention the German 2nd Army sta­
tioned to the north which could also have been deployed in Greece had there 
been a need. It was also true, per see, that W Force’s two infantry divisions 
and its armoured brigade fought, at various times in the campaign, three 
panzer divisions (2nd, 5th, and 9th), two mountain divisions (5th and 6th) the 
72nd Infantry Division, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Regiment, and the 
1st Parachute Division. This seems quite a disparity -  until, that is, the na­
ture of the fighting that actually took place is analysed. W Force, in fact, 
did not fight any of these divisions in the sense implied by those seeking 
to build a case for German numerical superiority. Its rearguard elements 
fought advance guards from these formations. At no time was a significant 
proportion of any German division in battle against W Force. As has been 
demonstrated, at the point of contact, the only place where relative num­
bers counted, more often than not W Force units outnumbered their attack­
ers. A paper count of divisions shows a clear German advantage, but it was 
never realised on the ground. At no point can W Force claim overwhelming 
German numbers pushed it unwillingly out of Greece.49 Current and future 
historians need to ‘unsubscribe’ to such an idea.
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